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Michael Saward 
Democracy and Competing Values 
WHERE IT IS PRACTISED, DEMOCRACY IS a)  NOT T H E  ONLY 
principle practised, and b) practised differently from the way 
it is practised in other places. Ifdemocracy has a clear mean- 
ing and clear requirements - I shall argue that it does - then 
we should be able to map out the bases on which degrees of 
democracy are traded off in the name of other values, and 
with what justification. In attempting to make some inroads 
into the serious conceptual and empirical problems this topic 
presents, my point of reference will be the modern nation- 
state, though the use of the phrase ‘political units’ throughout 
signals the fact that the argument largely holds for other 
geographically-defined entities as well. 
The perspective adopted is that of the democratic theorist 
seeking to make sense of key aspects of democratic practice. 
It is the observer, armed with his or her theory of democracy, 
who identifies and assesses competing values and possible 
trade-offs. Many political actors will, of course, want to deny 
that their most cherished restrictions on democratic out- 
comes are in fact competing values, or may involve trade-offs. 
They may protest that for them, and in this place, that is just 
what democracy means, especially now that democracy has 
no serious rivals in the global game of political legitimacy. We 
ought to listen carefully to their arguments, but at the same 
time be alert to slips into anti-democratic rhetoric and action. 
Among modern democratic theorists Dahl has made the 
most progress with regard to this problem. In his view, three 
points are crucial: 1 )  many substantive ideals are in fact sub- 
sumed within democratic procedures as preconditions of 
those procedures; 2) the promotion or defence of any non- 
preconditional ideals would require a non-democratic pro- 
cedure, something that is particularly difficult to justify; and 
3 )  in a democracy, we must trust in the people to recognize 
and defend basic rights (‘The democratic process is a gamble 
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on the possibilities that a people, in acting autonomously, will 
learn how to act rightly’).’ 
Although these conclusions are important and defensible, 
the scope of Dahl’s account is limited. He considers only 
overtly moral trade-offs (he speaks mostly of ‘fundamental 
rights’); other, perhaps more mundane and practical trade- 
offs, are also important, not least because they may reflect 
prior moral trade-offs. Accordingly, I shall distinguish four 
types of constraint on democracy - natural, systemic, prag- 
matic and moral. I shall then focus on specific examples of 
would-be moral constraints on democracy. The conclusion I 
reach is that, although no overtly moral notions are superior 
to democracy, different sorts of would-be moral constraints 
require different treatment by democratic theorists; and, that 
some distinctive types of moral constraint ought sometimes to 
be accepted (up to a point), but for largely pragmatic reasons. 
DEMOCRACY’S MEANING AND REQUIREMENTS 
Clearly, one’s view of democracy determines how the general 
problem will be approached. I f  one sees democracy as essen- 
tially contestable, then one has no effective or consistent 
means of identifying competing values and possible trade- 
offs. Accordingly, I begin with some general comments to out- 
line my preferred view. 
First, it is a standard observation that democracy is a term 
used so loosely that it may have lost nearly all its meaning. 
According to Gordon Graham, this process has gone so far 
that the term ‘democracy’ in its popular usage has come to 
mean simply ‘the most desirable form of government.’? My 
own position is that democracy has a clear, single most defen- 
sible meaning. Following John May, I define it as ‘responsive 
rule’. Adapting somewhat May’s fuller definition, democracy 
equals ‘necessary correspondence between acts of governance 
’ R. A. Dahl, Democracy and its Critics, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1989, 
G. Graham, ‘The Moral Basis of Democracy’, InternationalJournul of icloral and 
p. 192. 
Social Studies, Vol. 7, No.  2, 1992, p. 91. 
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and the equally-weighted felt interests of citizens with respect 
to those acts’. At its core, the responsive rule definition 
focuses our attention on the extent to which the people get 
what the people want. Any other definition, I would argue, 
wrongly builds in extra-democratic values favoured by the 
definer (often, for example, a preference for indirect repre- 
sentation rather than direct participation). In May’s words, 
this definition distinguishes ‘the nature of democracy from 
the nature of democracy’s prerequisites, indicators, by-pro- 
ducts, and merits.’3 
Secondly, a compelling justification for democracy - or 
responsive rule - can be built primarily on the principle of 
political equality. Political equality is the root value of demo- 
cracy, its metaprinciple. The defence of this view rests upon 
arguments that: a) there is something fundamentally equal 
about all people in that they share certain characteristics, such 
as a capacity for rationality, whatever the extent of their so 
sharing; b) faced with a need for binding collective decisions, 
the members of a political unit would accept that decisions 
which take each member’s views equally into account are 
more likely to be seen as legitimate, and therefore to foster 
social peace; and c) although politicians or  experts may in a 
sense know our interests better than we do for selected 
discrete decisions, across a range of relevant issues and people 
over time we ought to be regarded as the best judges of our 
own interests.4 In short, the reasons behind the fact that we 
ought to be regarded as political equals justify the definition 
of democracy in terms of responsiveness. 
Thirdly, democracy and constitutionalism are compatible 
in principle. If responsiveness is to be achieved, there are 
certain things citizens will (always) need. If democracy has an 
independent meaning and value, then its persistence is 
valuable. If its persistence is valuable, then factors essential to 
its persistence also have value, and ought to be protected even 
from democratic majorities. This point is now widely accep- 
’ J. D. May, ‘Defining Democracy’, Political Studies, Vol. 26, No. 1, 1978, p. 5. 
’ For a fuller account of the interest-based argument, see M. Saward, ‘Democratic 
Theory and Indices of Democratisation’ in D. Beetham (ed.), Defining and Measuring 
Democracy, London, Sage, 1994, pp. 6-24. 
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ted.5 Democracy is ‘self-binding’, or ‘self-limiting’; factors 
essential to the survival of democracy are properly taken out 
of majoritarian hands, without diminishing (and in fact en- 
hancing) the character of democracy itself. Briefly, this 
means that a democratic constitution will specify a) citizen 
democratic rights, and b) rules and institutions designed to 
maximize responsiveness. This is not a way to smuggle in what 
the strict definition pares away. It is an injunction to locate 
democracy’s essential conditions with as much deductive 
precision as possible. 
Fourthly, ‘full democracy’ is impossible. For example, no 
constitution contains, or can be expected to contain, only 
factors linked directly to democracy’s clear requirements. All 
democracies are democracies somewhere, sometime. Place, cir- 
cumstance and history throw up factors more or less unique 
to single political systems. Put another way, any living demo- 
cratic system inevitably embodies trade-offs in the name of 
other values. Our task is to separate the inevitable from the 
optional, the acceptable from the spurious. 
Taking these points on board, we can construct a snapshot 
view of the requirements of democracy. At the core lie mech- 
anisms for the expression of wants on the basis of political 
equality and rights that make those mechanisms meaningful: 
free and fair elections, and the right to vote and to stand for 
office. These mechanisms are essential to the achievement of 
responsiveness. Semi-peripheral are rights which underpin core 
rights and mechanisms, namely rights to freedom of speech 
and association. These rights go some way towards fostering 
responsiveness to preferences which are at least minimally 
well-informed. More peripheral are rights which are in effect 
preconditions of core democratic rights, the most important 
being the right to an adequate education and access to ade- 
quate health care provision. This set of rights concerns basic 
conditions of citizens’ well-being and their capacity to partici- 
pate in public affairs. 
Arguments that some increment of democracy should be 
traded off, or diluted, to achieve a specified value may target 
See in particular J. Elster and R. Slagstad (eds), Constitutionalism and Democracy, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988. 
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any or each of these requirements, to varying degrees, and for 
a variety of reasons. We ought to be particularly wary of argu- 
ments that core democratic requirements should be traded 
off in the name of a competing value. 
CONSTRAINTS ON DEMOCRACY A TYPOLOGY 
We can identify four general types of constraint on demo- 
cracy. I do not suggest that the typology is watertight. Indeed, 
it is the real-world slippages between categories that are most 
interesting. I suggest that we think of constraints, actual or 
potential, on democracy as being natural, systemic, pragmatic 
or moral in character. 
Natural constraints. Natural constraints are unavoidable, 
basic constitutive features of a given political unit. Examples 
include: 
- geographical and demographic factors such as land size 
and population size, since these affect capacities for face-to- 
face decision-making; 
- what Beetham calls ‘the economy of time’;6 proper 
consideration of political questions requires that not all can 
participate in their resolution; 
- the time lag (inevitable even in the most fortuitous 
circumstances) between policy decision and implementation; 
- the fact that past choices constrain present and future 
political agendas; 
- logical problems in mechanisms for discovering ‘the will 
of the people;” 
- a minimal requirement for internal consistency between 
different policies pursued at the same time (like tax and wel- 
fare policies); and 
- more indirect natural constraints arising from the natu- 
ral resource base of a political unit, since the economic restric- 
tions or opportunities these afford in a given case will restrict 
D. Beetham, ‘The Limits of Democratisation’, in D. Held (ed.), Prospects for 
Democracy, Cambridge, Polity, 1993, pp. 60ff. 
’See I. McLean, ’Mechanisms for Democracy’, in D. Held and C. Pollitt (eds), New 
Form of Democracy, London, Sage, 1986 pp. 135-57. J. Wolff, ‘Democratic Voting and 
the Mixed-Motivation Problem’, Analysis, Vol. 54, No.  4, pp. 193-96. 
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choices between different styles of political development. 
Variously, these considerations represent constraints of 
place, circumstance and logic. 
Systemic constraints. Systemic constraints arise from past 
practices and established institutions that are human-made 
but which may appear to be intrinsic (or natural) properties 
of a given political unit at a certain time. Systemic constraints 
may appear - or, rather, may be presented as - unavoidable, 
but in principle they involve more optional choices than 
natural constraints. 
They include: 
- various aspects of political culture, including the scope 
and intensity of religious affiliation and the form of national 
identity; 
- the state of technology and the rate of technological 
development; 
- the degree of organizational complexity in a system; and 
- the position and status of a state in the larger system of 
states. 
Particularly important here are constraints of place and 
circumstance arising from political culture. As facts, these are 
fixed, so to speak. But as facts, they must be interpreted by 
political leaders and inf luentials. I will deal with the interpre- 
tation of place and circumstance when discussing moral con- 
straints below. To take another example, it is arguable that 
political and administrative complexity - structural, func- 
tional and technical - in modern states gives rise to layers of 
administrative non-responsiveness, increases the role of 
‘experts’ of one sort or another over and above citizens and 
their representatives, and involves much delegation of poli- 
tical responsibility to unelected officials with ambiguous 
accountability. 
Moreover, systemic constraints can be viewed as frozen 
moral constraints. Widespread adherence within a political 
unit to a particular religious doctrine is a deep-rooted systemic 
fact that reflects a myriad of historical moral choices. Simi- 
larly, demands for state provision of welfare lead to state com- 
plexity; after, that complexity appears as a non-optional 
feature of the system, even (perhaps especially) if the form of 
provision changes. But at some point, choices - moral choices 
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- were made to bring about complexity, even as an uninten- 
ded (or ill-thought-out) consequence of pursuing certain 
moral paths.8 
Pragmatic constraints. Natural constraints, which as we have 
seen incorporate logical constraints, are timeless and un- 
avoidable. Systemic constraints are ‘synthetic’ in the sense that 
they are human-made, and they are more time-specific, requi- 
ring us to look back to historical features of given political 
units (and to present interpretations of that history). Prag- 
matic constraints concern present trade-offs of democracy 
which (or so i t  is argued) are necessary to produce political 
stability and predictability, taking natural and systemic factors 
into account. A flavour of the difference between systemic 
and pragmatic constraints can be gleaned from Lipset’s 
comment that: ‘Cultural factors deriving from varying 
histories are extraordinarily difficult to manipulate. Political 
institutions - including electoral systems and constitutional 
arrangements - are more easily ~ h a n g e d . ’ ~  
Examples of pragmatic constraints - the core stuff of 
political science writing on the development of democratic 
systems - include:” 
- the perceived need for institutions of consensus where 
democracy involves considerable conflict; 
- the concentration of power in few hands in the name of 
governability where democracy requires widespread partici- 
pation; and 
- the need for effectiveness in order to generate demo- 
* For some theorists, such as Danilo Zolo, the constraints of complexity are so 
pervasive that we must revise democratic theory from a position of ultra-realism that 
would have made even Joseph Schurnpeter blush. See D. Zolo, Democrucj and 
Compnplexity, Cambridge, Polity, 1992. For others, like Dahl when he writes of ‘Polyarchy 
11’ and Beetham as he pursues a ‘democratic audit’ of the British political system, 
choices to democratize seemingly frozen properties of systems are available to us: 
there are, so to speak, moral niches in the complex, partisan state. See Dahl, op. cit., 
pp. 336-38, and D. Beetham, ‘Key Principles and Indices for a Democratic Audit’, in 
D. Beetham (ed.), op. cit., pp. 6-24. 
S. M. Lipset, ‘The Centrality of Political Culture’, in L. Diamond and M. F. 
Plattner (eds), The Global Resurgence oJDemocrucy, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1993, p. 137. 
lo  Each of these points is taken from the discussion in L. Diamond, ‘Three 
Paradoxes of Democracy’, in L. Diamond and M. F. Plattner (eds). op. cit., pp. 95-107. 
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cratic legitimacy, whereas consent is the more proper basis of 
democratic legitimacy. 
Moral constraints. On the one hand, moral constraints con- 
cern the present interpretation of seemingly systemic constraints 
concerning ‘place and circumstance’: religion, national 
identity and other features of a political culture. These factors 
may involve constraints on democracy arising from what 
Walzer calls ‘thick’ conceptions of justice - i.e. those evident 
in particular times and places and not shared by other 
political units, at least not quite in the same configuration.” 
On the other hand, moral constraints may arise from 
present desires to realize substantive principles which appear 
to stand apart from democracy. As I have defined it, demo- 
cracy involves outcomes that are largely open-ended; aside 
from restrictions arising from democracy’s essential condi- 
tions, majorities can decide what they want to decide. When 
the pursuit of substantive principles other than democracy 
may further restrict the open-endedness of policy outcomes, 
then we are most clearly in need of guiding principles for 
recognizing and conducting appropriate value trade-offs. 
In a good deal of contemporary political philosophy these 
questions are resolved by assuming - often implicitly - that 
democracy is either or both a) a lesser value than social 
justice, or b) comfortably subsumed under a substantive prin- 
ciple like social justice. In A Theory ofJustice, Rawls makes it 
clear that most substantive political questions should be 
resolved before democratic majorities can get their hands on 
them.12 Against this, I propose that we take our rhetoric 
seriously; if it is true that we are all democrats now, let us 
” M. Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad, Notre Dame, 
Indiana, University of Notre Dame Press, 1994. 
I p  J. Rawls, A Theory ojjustice, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1972. Although he 
uses the term democracy often - or at least ‘constitutional democracy’ - implicitly 
Rawls accepts the current minimalist version of democracy’s meaning rather than the 
more radical interpretation implicit in my own approach. For present purposes, I wish 
to side-step the complex issue of the comparative status of democracy and social 
justice. As Shapiro has written, theorists of democracy and theorists ofjustice tend 
to talk past one another, often implicitly prioritizing the value they seek to elucidate. 
See I. Shapiro, ‘Three Ways to be a Democrat’, Political Theory, Vol. 2 2 ,  No.  1, 
pp. 124-51. 
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grant priority to what rhetorically we commonly argue to be 
our fundamental political value. 
Examples of moral constraints include: 
- a strong version of individual liberty (defending the view 
that the legitimate functions of the state cannot go beyond 
protection against ‘force, theft and fraud’, to use Nozick’s 
terms);’? 
- a strong version of distributive equality (which aims for 
near equality of outcomes in terms of income and wealth 
holdings); 
- ecological sustainability (where the overriding criteria for 
acceptable policies is their contribution to lessening consider- 
ably the ecological impact of social activities); and 
- the principled claims of the religious republic, which 
promote the tenets of a single religion above other principles, 
and in which the primary source of political legitimacy is seen 
as being internal to that religion. 
COMMENTS O N  THE TYPOLOGY 
The typology is useful because it suggests a range of points 
which offer theoretical, and indeed strategic, guidance. 
Among the key points are the following: 
- discussions of trade-offs of democracy in the name of 
other goods must take into account the full range of types of 
trade-off involved. These do not just involve present choices 
between increments of democracy and increments of other 
pragmatic and/or moral values, but also prior trade-offs 
which shape enduring facets of living systems and therefore 
constrain considerably the character of present choices; 
- the categories serve as a reminder that any democratic 
system must involve trade-offs in the name of (all) natural 
constraints and (some) systemic constraints; 
- the character of systemic constraints is such that their 
presence in a living system is inevitable, though any one 
element within the total system of systemic constraints is not 
inevitable. Background morality, in the form of a political 
I’ R. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Oxford, Blackwell, 1974. 
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culture, evolves over time and is constantly subject to change 
and revision, even if the time-scales involved are hundreds 
rather than tens of years; 
- in terms of present political choices of the pragmatic and 
moral varieties, what counts as relevant background is not so 
much natural and systemic constraints as facts, but rather the 
present interpretation of the character and degree of those 
constraints. l 4  The interpretation of natural and systemic 
factors may take a pragmatic or moral form; 
- slippages between categories in political debate will be 
rational strategically for political actors, since natural, 
systemic and pragmatic constraints carry (from greater to 
lesser degrees, respectively) a sense of inevitability which may 
render them less controversial - more a matter of neutral 
assessment of unavoidable circumstances - than proposed 
moral constraints. Thus, for example, the common desire 
among political leaders in Britain to avoid the use of refer- 
enda is often presented as arising from a mere systemic fact 
about the traditional character of British parliamentary 
democracy. We must be aware of political science presenta- 
tions of moral trade-offs in the name of pragmatic or other 
constraints. Thus for Machiavellians who want less democracy 
without being seen to act accordingly, the lesson is to present 
moral trade-offs as being systemic or natural in character 
wherever possible; 
-where the boundaries of the political unit itself are drawn 
is a systemic rather than a natural matter, however often it is 
presented as a matter of immovable natural fact; 
- for observers concerned to recognize and to block unne- 
cessary or unjustified trade-offs of democracy, the lessons 
involve how to spot a spurious trade-off argument, and the 
need not to assume that non-democratic claims need be anti- 
democratic claims. 
I' Dobson provides an example: ecological attitudes to the fact of finiteness and 
scarcity of natural resources do not throw up any one obvious corresponding model 
of political institutions, though they do constrain the range of choices between sets 
of institutional arrangements. See A. Dobson, Green Political Thought, 2nd edition, 
London, Routledge, 1995, chapter 3. 
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FOCUS O N  COMPETING MORAL VALUES 
The typology and the points that arise from it are essential 
background if we are to see moral constraints, and proposed 
moral trade-offs of democracy, in all of their dimensions. 
The first democratic response to those who argue that 
certain moral values must, in some respects, take precedence 
over democratic outcomes is: go and set out your stall in the 
democratic marketplace of ideas and do your best to gather 
converts (and votes). It is by no means uncommon for those 
proposing change according to a certain principle to regard 
the change as vital regardless of whether a majority, or 
democratically elected authorities, likewise regard it as such. 
Indeed, that may be the exception rather than the rule, 
though often it can be set aside as a strategic device rather 
than a substantive claim. When moral proponents argue in 
this way, though, the democrat may need more conceptual 
tools to assess their claims. I turn now to what this may 
involve. 
I would suggest a number of categories to help us assess the 
status of the would-be alternative moral values (that is, values 
that ought to be realized regardless of whether or  not they 
may be democratically chosen). l 5  For the democrat, this 
involves accepting, as a working hypothesis, the possibility 
that there may be values that are superior to democracy, 
either in general or in certain circumstances; and, therefore, 
that there may be legitimate grounds for trading-off some 
increment of democracy in the name of that alternative value. 
By locating various moral values in these categories, we can 
gain an initial insight into (so to speak) their conceptual 
distance from democracy. In this way we can, for example, 
assess the degree of incompatibility between achieving demo- 
cracy and the other moral value. The questions to ask are as 
follows. 
l5 In this section I draw on work by Dahl and Goodin, though I reinterpret and add 
to their accounts of (respectively) deniocracy’s internal and external values and the 
nature of political trade-offs. See Dahl, op.  cit., pp. 163-92, and R. E. Goodin, 
‘Political Ideals and Political Practice’, British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 25, 1995, 
pp. 37-56. 
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1) Is the alternative value a permanent essential precondition 
of democracy? Or, in other words, is it in fact internal to 
democracy? 
2) Is the alternative value a temporarily essential precondition 
of democracy? If so, then we can say that it is internal to 
democracy for a limited period. 
3) Is the alternative value linked conceptually to demo- 
cracy’s essential preconditions, though not itself expressing 
an essential precondition? If so, we can call it semi-external to 
democracy. 
4 )  Is the alternative value deducible directly from the root 
value (or metaprinciple) of democracy, namely political 
equality? 
5) Is the alternative value one that has no links to either 
democracy’s essential preconditions or root value? If so, it is 
a value that is strictly external to democracy. 
6 )  Is the alternative value external to democracy as in 5), 
but one which represents an interpretation of inevitable extra- 
democratic elements of a living political system (in other 
words, it is an interpretation of the constraints arising from place 
and circumstance)? 
In short, these categories require us to think carefully about 
the character of the moral value proposed as a constraint on 
democracy. In essence, we must consider its relationship to 
democracy’s preconditions and/or root values. The only ex- 
ception is that of competing values which represent an inter- 
pretation of inevitable constraints on democracy arising from 
place and circumstance. Although the categories are presen- 
ted as if only ‘yes or no’ answers can be given for any proposed 
value, in reality what we must ask is: ‘to what extent can a 
compelling case be made for the alternative value to be 
[internal to democracy, etc.] . . . ’2’ Further, a given alternative 
value may figure in more than one of the categories. So, for 
example, we might ask: ‘to what extent can a compelling case 
be made for strict distributive equality to be either or both a 
value internal to democracy or deducible directly from 
democracy’s root value - or, for it to be an unavoidable extra- 
democratic value in a given time and place?’ 
To the extent that an (apparently) alternative value falls 
wholly into categories 1) or 2) - permanent and temporarily 
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essential preconditions - no trade-off with democracy is 
required. The alternative value is not, in fact, alternative or 
competing, but only appeared to be so. Categories 3) and 4) 
- semi-external and root values - represent values which do 
compete with democracy up to a point. 
Values that fall into category 5) - external - are truly 
competing values. With them, we must ask what is their root 
value, where does it come from, and why should its propo- 
nents suppose it superior to democracy? For values that fall 
into category 6) - interpretation of place and circumstance - 
the focus is somewhat different. For them, we must try to 
assess how the claims concerned measure up to the known 
facts about the history and culture of the political unit in 
question. As with category 5), careful interrogation is essen- 
tial, since a genuine trade-off of a real measure of democracy 
is involved in accepting the legitimacy of claims made on 
behalf of the competing value. 
Can these guidelines help us when confronted with pro- 
posed trade-offs of some measure of democracy? I will pursue 
this question with respect to individual liberty, distributive 
equality, ecological sustainability and the religious republic. 
These are illustrative examples only. I deal with them far too 
briefly to make anything more than tentative suggestions. 
Example I: individual liberty. Some of what libertarians like 
NozickI6 seek is in fact internal to democracy, and thus fits 
our category 1). However, those sympathetic factors internal 
to democracy - because they are permanent essential pre- 
conditions of democracy - are limited to such guaranteed 
freedoms as those of speech and association. As Beetham 
notes, ‘Of course not all individual rights are democratic rights, 
but without the guaranteed right of all citizens to meet 
collectively, to have access to information, to seek to persuade 
others, as well as to vote, democracy would be meaningle~s’.’~ 
But this limited degree of compatibility between the two 
values ends when the strongly anti-redistributive goal of 
libertarians clashes with the democratic preconditions of 
equal access to education and health care provision. To quote 
l6 op. cit. 
I’ Beetham, ‘The Limits of Democratization’, loc. cit., p. 56 
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Beetham again, the latter preconditions concern ‘the capa- 
cities and opportunities that people need if they are to exer- 
cise their legally established rights’.I8 
It also clashes with the root value of democracy in terms of 
the potential acceptance of vast resource inequalities within 
the demos. Turning the point around slightly, the social pre- 
conditions of democracy require taxes, the root value of 
democracy requires fair taxes, but progressive taxes (or even 
any taxes at all) offend the separate root value of libertarians. 
Further, the libertarian root value - inviolable individual 
rights, especially to justly-acquired property - is arguably less 
defensible than the root value of democracy. Nozick, for 
example, simply posits these strong individual rights without 
offering a positive argument as to why we ought to accept 
them.I9 
Despite its weakness in comparison to the root value of 
democracy, the libertarian root value is a universal value; i t  
cannot be other than a value which appeals to us regardless 
of era or location. As such, it rules itself out for consideration 
in terms of other categories of potential trade-offs of demo- 
cracy, namely category 2) - temporarily essential precon- 
ditions - and category 6) - interpretation of constraints of 
place and circumstance. Hence, in sum, up to a point no 
trade-off is required between libertarianism and democracy; 
beyond that point none of the reasonable bases for serious 
consideration of trade-offs applies. 
It should be noted, however, that libertarians do have 
resources to call upon to fight their corner within operating 
democratic procedures. In a democratic society, citizens pre- 
sumably will be receptive to arguments to extend further 
freedoms that, in the form of freedom of speech and associa- 
tion, are intrinsic parts of democratic procedures themselves. 
They will also be receptive to arguments about individual 
autonomy and self-government. The trick for libertarians will 
be to allay doubts arising from the apparent weakness of their 
argument in terms of the root value of democracy. Be that as 
it may, there is no case for an extra-democratic trade-off. 
Is ibid., p. 59. 
I9 op. cit. 
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Example 2: distributive equality. Here, the alternative value to 
be considered is a strong version of distributive equality, 
which I define in terms of its requirement for near-equal sub- 
stantive outcomes in terms of wealth holdings in particular. 
Like libertarianism, there is a limited extent to which this 
principle is internal to democracy, as one of the latter’s per- 
manent essential preconditions. This compatibility is limited 
to equalization required for universalizing adequate citizen 
access to education and health care. 
The strong principle of distributive equality may offend to 
a degree against the preconditions of speech and association 
freedoms; but only fairly weakly, since these freedoms are not 
likely to be much undermined. Further, the link between this 
principle and democracy’s root value may not be as strong as 
may at first appear to be the case. Arguably, each interprets 
the root value quite differently; distributive equality demands 
a profound equalization of citizens’ means, while democracy’s 
is to treat citizens with equal respect in more clearly proce- 
dural terms. 
As with libertarianism, the root value of strong distributive 
equality makes a universal claim, and hence cannot be con- 
sidered as a legitimate source of trade-offs under other 
categories. So, in sum, we have a limited area in which the 
competing values overlap, and therefore where no trade-off 
need be considered; an exploitable but ultimately weak link to 
democracy’s root value; and beyond this, no grounds for 
considering a legitimate trade-off are available. As with liber- 
tarianism, however, the link with democracy’s root value 
provides grounds for advocates of strong distributive equality 
to put their case with some effectiveness within operating 
democratic processes. Citizens will recognize, or can be 
persuaded to recognize, the links between what makes demo- 
cracy distinctive and valuable and what advocates of strong 
distributive equality are attempting to achieve. 
Example 3: ecological sustainability. Strong versions of 
ecological sustainability suggest that prevailing patterns of 
economic, social and political activity systematically ignore 
the limits of the earth’s carrying, productive and absorbent 
capacity. As such, in the strongest versions at least, they 
threaten the imminent demise of civilization as we know it. 
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On the face of things, ecological sustainability is a poor 
candidate for potential trade-offs with democracy. There is a 
case for its inclusion in category 3), with a class of environ- 
mental rights attached to democracy’s health care rights, but 
the strength of this case is at best ambiguous.20 
Further, the ecological root values of sustainability are far 
removed from the root value of democracy, and more clearly 
involve committing the naturalistic fallacy in deriving norms 
from facts about the natural world.” 
However, to the extent that the case for ecological sustain- 
ability is compelling, so too is its claim to fit our category 2) - 
as a temporarily essential precondition of democracy. To that 
extent, the case for trading-off some democracy in order to 
institute sustainability is one that must be taken seriously. 
Given that greens are more often accused of being anti- 
democrats than are libertarians or socialists, that is perhaps a 
surprising conclusion, but it works if the categories which 
guide our discussion are adequate to the task. 
I argued in outline above that libertarians and strong egali- 
tarians must simply fight their corner within democratic pro- 
cesses (one might add that, since elements of each are internal 
to democracy, this may initially involve fighting for demo- 
cracy to be more fully realized). Political ecologists ought to 
do the same, though I have suggested that they may have less 
scope for drawing upon conceptual resources internal to 
democracy (though they would by no means lack such 
resources). But in the case of ecological sustainability, there 
is the stronger, external sense in which democratic systems 
may perish if the fears that give rise to this ideal (or imper- 
ative) are well-founded. Scientific uncertainty bedevils that 
topic, of course, but there is a strong case for adopting the 
‘precautionary principle’ (desist unless you are sure your 
*O For an effort to derive the appropriate precondition, see M. Saward, ‘Must 
Democrats be Environmentalists?’, in B. Doherty and M. de Geus (eds), Democracy and 
Green Political Thought, London, Routledge, 1996, pp. 79-96. 
*‘However, ifjustice and autonomy were regarded as the root values of both 
ecology and democracy, then bringing other animals and life-forms into the demos 
with humans would give us a radically altered picture of democracy - a truly green 
democracy? See R. Eckersley, ‘Greening Liberal Democracy’, in B. Doherty and M. 
de Geus (eds), ibid., pp. 212-36. 
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actions will not contribute to or  cause major obstacles to 
sustainability) in any case. 
Example 4: the religious republic. This is where the dominant 
religion is entrenched within the legal and political structure 
of a political unit in some more or less permanent manner. 
Clearly this involves trading-off democracy, often to a con- 
siderable degree. Recently, for example, something like one- 
third of nominated candidates for the Iranian national 
elections were rejected by the Islamic Guardian Council 
because their Islamic credentials were perceived to be lacking 
in some way. The Guardian Council also ‘ensures that all 
legislation is compatible with Islamic law.’‘2 The root value of 
the religious republic grants privileged roles to religious 
leaders: it at best represents a very particular interpretation of 
democracy’s root value, so that in general we can say there is 
little overlap. The religious republic idea is even more clearly 
not a part of democracy’s essential preconditions, perma- 
nently or otherwise, since strong guarantees for freedom of 
association would militate against favouring greater freedom 
for those who profess a particular religious outlook. 
However, it does represent an interpretation of inevitable 
extra-democratic constraints (an interpretation of the con- 
straints of place and circumstance) on living democratic 
systems. We must be careful with the interpretation - even in 
Iran there is much dispute between pluralists and integristes 
as to how much democracy is compatible with Islamic prin- 
ciples - but the raw facts of religious composition of the 
country suggest at least that there is some deeply systemic 
feature to be interpreted, so to speak. As Beetham‘3 and 
Weale’4 point out, the source of extra-democratic commands 
can render them genuinely authoritative and a part of 
political legitimacy, taking political systems in the round. 
Accordingly, in our present terms, the religious authorities 
may represent a legitimate source of interpretations of inevi- 
table constraints of place and circumstance. 
2 p  See S. T. Hunter, ‘Iran’, in S. M. Lipset et al. (eds), The Encyclopedia oJDemocracy, 
Washington, DC and London, Congressional Quarterly and Routledge, 1995, p. 631. 
23 D. Beetham, The Legitimation oJPower, London, Macmillan, 1992. 
A. Weale, ‘The Limits of Democracy’, in A. Hamlin and P. Pettit (eds), The Good 
Polity, Oxford, Blackwell, 1989, pp. 35-48. 
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So, perhaps surprisingly, advocates of (for example) Islamic 
republics for clearly Islamic societies, or Hindu republics for 
Hindu societies, must be taken seriously by democrats as 
trade-off  candidate^.'^ As with ecological sustainability, a 
much fuller knowledge of the facts of cases would be needed 
before the democrat would accept the legitimacy of some 
trade-off. However much they may scorn historians and 
anthropologists, political theorists will have to regard their 
knowledge as essential to formulating and responding to the 
relevant moral questions. 
MORAL OR PRAGMATIC TRADE-OFFS? 
Our preliminary conclusion is that trading off some incre- 
ment of democracy may be legitimate in cases where the pro- 
posed alternative values represent either a) temporary 
essential preconditions of democracy, or b) compelling, and 
historically supportable, interpretations of the constraints of 
place and circumstance. No other grounds were seen to give 
rise to a compelling case for trading-off democracy. It seems, 
then, that there are grounds upon which moral constraints 
external to democracy (for the most part) may legitimately 
constrain democracy. 
However, this picture looks rather different if we ask: 
exactly why do such categories of principles seem to provide 
such a strong case? Perhaps the key question to ask in seeking 
to fix the terms of such trade-offs is: will not trading-off an 
increment of democracy threaten fundamentally the contin- 
ued viability of the political unit in question? Some advocates 
‘’ Walzer’s comments, although not concerned with religion as such, are apposite 
in this context. He writes: ‘Were I to be invited to visit China and give a seminar on 
democratic theory, I would explain, as best I could, my own views about the meaning 
of democracy. But I would try to avoid the missionizing tone, for my views include 
the idea that democracy in China will have to be Chinese - and my explanatory powers 
do  not reach to what that means. . . The principle of consent requires this much at 
least: that Chinese democracy be defined by the Chinese themselves in terms of their 
own history and culture . . . They must make their own claims, their own codifications 
(a Chinese bill of rights?), and their own interpretive arguments’. See Walzer, op. cit., 
pp. 60-61. 
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of ecological sustainability, for example, would answer 
positively, citing the fact that included in the package of exist- 
ing practices that are unsustainable are the freedoms associa- 
ted intrinsically with democracy itself.26 The advocate of the 
religious republic may cite the dangers to social stability if 
open criticism of deeply-rooted and widely-shared religious 
doctrines is protected, as the freedoms intrinsic to democracy 
would allow. 
In other words, what is ultimately at stake is the survival of 
the political unit; therefore, I would suggest that what is 
actually recommended is a pragmatic trade-off of democracy, 
either on a temporary or a relatively permanent basis, in the 
name of a classic pragmatic value: social stability and viability. 
A seeming moral argument takes on a rather more clearly 
pragmatic hue, though perhaps the word pragmatic under- 
states (for example) the urgency of necessary changes if the 
arguments of deep greens are right. 
In the case of the religious republic, one might take the 
view that some change in the boundaries of the political unit 
could be democratically acceptable, and s o  the proposed 
constraints, be they moral or  pragmatic in character, need not 
be accepted by democrats in the name of preserving that 
political unit in its present form, with its present boundaries. 
However, here we run up against what is arguably the problem 
that cannot be resolved satisfactorily within democratic 
theory: how can we distinguish, on democratic grounds, bet- 
ween competing claims for the location of the boundaries of 
discrete political units (in this case, the nation-state)? The 
prevailing answer is that we cannot; that democrats must 
simply accept that history - wars, conquest, compromise and 
the strength of extra-democratic group identities - provide us 
with political units,27 and the task of democrats is to see that 
“See for example W. Ophuls and A. S. Boyan, Ecology and / h e  Politics of Scarcity 
Revisited, New York, W. H. Freeman & Co., 1992. 
“The  classic presentation of this view is F. Whetan, ‘Prologue: Democratic 
Theory and the Boundary Problem’ in J. R. Pennock and R. W. Chapinan (eds), N o ~ n o s  
X X V  Liberal Democracy, New York and London, New York University Press, 1985, 
pp. 15-47. See also the discussion in M .  Canovan, Nationhood and Political Theory, 
Cheltenham, UK, and Brookfield, USA, Edward Elgar, 1996, chapter ?I. 
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those units are governed democratically to the maximum 
degree feasible. With this route substantially closed, the 
democrat must backtrack to consider seriously the pragmatic 
claims, presented as moral imperatives, of the likes of ecolo- 
gists and religious republic advocates about the need to trade- 
off some increment of democracy. 
The key task of the democrat in such cases is twofold. First, 
one must see that as little democracy is traded-off as possible 
in the circumstances, and ask in particular if it is a core 
component, or a more peripheral one, that is being diluted. 
For example, retaining otherwise fair elections but placing 
some restrictions of freedom of association may be more 
acceptable than leaving freedom of association but holding 
no, or utterly rigged, elections. And secondly, one must inter- 
rogate the claims, factual and interpretive, of those who would 
propose the trade-offs, drawing upon the full array of histor- 
ical, scientific and anthropological evidence available. This is 
a difficult task, no doubt, but an essential one in a world of 
fragile democracies where sometimes a highly circumscribed 
democracy may be the best that can be hoped for.28 
**The author wishes to thank the participants at the MANCEPT conference on  
‘New Directions in Democratic Theory’, University of Manchester, March 1996, for 
their comments on an earlier version of this article. 
